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Abstract-In Observing and interacting with the real physical
world sensor networks now take new opportunities for play the
roles in almost everywhere. They are composed of a large
number of sensor nodes and each sensor node has capabilities of
sensing, processing, and communication , which underpinned by
limited energy. Reducing energy consumption was, is and will be
a major concern in sensor networks. For the given extremely
limited hardware resources on sensor nodes and the inclement
deploying environment, the adversary attack becomes a serious
security threat toward wireless sensor networks. In this paper a
secure public-key based effective and efficient sensor network is
to be introduced. A saving time, reducing computing energy,
algorithm is carefully investigated. The powerful elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) over GF (2m) is also investigated with
hidden generator point.
decreasing the computing time [5-12] within the security
systems, and etc.
It is noted that recently, there is a trend for the sensor
networks that the sensor group leaders rather than sensors
communicate to the end database as there is an effect way to
save the storages and power energy for the "pre-computing
data" in the sensor networks [13-15]. However, the algorithms
related to this trend will inherently create chance for an
attacker to make a "man-in-middle" attack, which is shown in
Figure 1.
End Database
Figure1. Schematic diagramshowspossible attackmadeby "man-in-
middle" in sensornetwork (in particular for the case with"group leader"
communications.)
Therefore there is necessary to design security system to
protect the networks from the man-in-middle attacks. In this
paper we are going to present two ways to protect the network
from man-in-middle attacks based on hidden generator point
over elliptic curve cryptography for public keys.
The next section will discuss the general tradition elliptic
curve cryptography with our focus, which will be modified for
our proposed protocols to protect the networks from the man-
in-middle attacks. In section 3, the two ways based on the
hidden generator point will be investigated, with which we can
see either way will carry on the protection works. In section 4,
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I. INTRODUCTION
The advancements in sensor technology, several sensor
networks have been being deployed in various applications for
observing and interacting with the physical world. Those
sensor networks are composed of a large number of sensor
nodes and each sensor node has capabilities of sensing,
processing, and communication. These sensor nodes are
normally deployed in environments where they may be hard to
access and provide various useful data. It is well known that
applications for wireless sensor networks fall in three major
categories, namely (1) periodic sensing; (2) event-driven; and
(3) query-based. However, all those categories are challenges
because of the limited battery resources on each sensor node.
The nodes are usually deployed in an unattended manner. It is
not easy work to replace the batteries. Therefore, reducing
energy consumption was, is and will be a major concern in
sensor networks.
For the given the extremely limited hardware resources on
sensor nodes and the inclement deploying environment, the
adversary attack becomes a serious security threat toward
wireless sensor networks. Without adequate defenses
mechanism, the adversary can simply inundate the network by
flooding the bogus data packets, and paralyze the partial or
whole sensor network by depleting mode battery power.
There are many ways to discuss reducing energy
consumption such as reducing the communication using the
temporal and/or spatial correlation of sensor readings [1-4],
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there is a new algorithm introduced, which is a method with
minimizing Hamming weight based on curve cryptography
over GF (2m) . In the fmal section, a conclusion of this paper
will be given.
For each value ofx one needs to determine whether or not it is
a quadratic residue. If it is the case, then there are two values
in the elliptic group. If not, then the point is not in the elliptic
Ep(a,b) group.
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Figure 3. Elliptic curve eqaution (5)
II. BRIEF PICTURE FOR A TRADITIONAL ECC PROTOCOL
An elliptic curve is the set of solutions of an equation of the
form can be shown as below:
where a, b, c, d, and e, are real numbers.
A special addition operation is defined over elliptic curves and
this with the inclusion of a point o, called point at infinity. If
three points are on a line intersecting an elliptic curve, then
their sum is equal to this point at infinity a, which acts as the
identity element for this addition operation. Sometimes the
genera equation (I) can be referred as Weierstrass equation as
shown in (2):
y2 +axy+by = x 3+Cx2+dx + e (I)
If we wanted use a elliptic curve to be used for cryptography
the necessary condition is the curve is not singular, i.e. the
discriminant ofpolynomialj{x) = x3+ax +b :
Figures I and 2 show the two elliptic curves are
y2 = x 3 +2x+5
and
(2)
(3)
(4)
When we fixed a prime number, p and then via the fixed
constants a and b we have the Galois Field Ep(a,b) group.
For example, let the points P =(x), YI) and Q (X2,y2) be in
the elliptic group Ep(a,b) group and 0 be the point at infinity.
The rules for addition over the elliptic group Ep(a,b) are :
(i) P+tJ = tJ+ P = P
(ii) If X2 = XI and Y2 = - Yh that is P(XhYI) and Q = (X2, Y2) =
(XI- YI) =- P, that is the case: P+Q = tJ.
(iii) If Q =I -P, then their sum P+Q = (x3, Y3) is given by ;
x3 = A? -XI -x2 modp
An elliptic fOup over the Galois Field Ep(a,b) is obtained
by computing x + ax + b mod p for 0 :::; x < p. The constant a
and b are non negative integers smaller than the prime number
p and as here we used "mod p", so equation (3) should be read
as:
· 1
(7)
where A == l~: =:: if P *Q (8)
3x~ +a if P=Q
2YI
In order to describe our new protocol of the hidden
generator point we, without losing generality, use an example
for the above description. Let's have p = 23 (in real case the p
will be much larger than this) and a = I and b =1, i.e. the
equation becomes: / = x3 +x +1 mod 23. We have 4a3+27b2
mod 23 = 8 =I O. Now we need to determine ifY2 is in the set of
quadratic residues or not. The calculation results are shown
below for the elliptic group Ep(a,b) = E23 (1,1) which includes
the point (4, 0) corresponding to the single value Y = O.
The elliptic curve cryptography can be used to encrypt
plaintext messages, M, into ciphertexts. The plaintext message
M is encoded into a point PM from the finite set of points in the
elliptic group, Ep(a,b). First step consists in choosing a
generator point, GE Ep(a,b), such that the smallest value of n
for which nG = tJ is a very large prime number. Normally the
traditional ECC protocol is let the elliptic group Ep(a,b) and the(6)
(5)
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Bob received the ciphertext pair of points, Pc then multiplies 10
the first point , (kG) with his private key, nB, and then adds the
result to the second point in the ciphertext pair of points as 5
shown below :
generator point G be in public . The each user select a private
key, say n« < n and compute the public key PA as PA = nAG.
Then, encrypt the message point PM for the partner, say from
Alice to Bob. So Alice (A) chose a random integer k and
computes the ciphertext pair of points Pc using Bob 's public
key PB: • .-.-• • •
•
• • •
•
•
•
- .
• • •
.-
• • •
• • •
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(9)
(10)
which is the plaintext point , corresponding to the plaintext
message M. It is noted that only Bob can obtain retrieve the
plantext information PM by the private key nB. The
cryptographic strength of ECC lies in the difficulty for a
cryptanalyst to determine the secret random number k from kP
and P itself. The fast method to solve this problem is known as
the elliptic curve logarithm problem (ECLP) [16].
III. OURPROPOSAL METHODS PROTECTING FROM MAN-IN-
THE MIDDLE INECC
We have seen that the ECC did not take care of the man-in-
the middle attacks even ECC itself has its cryptographic
strength as described above .
As above shown that the generator point G and elliptic
group Ep(a,b) are in public . Now let's have a closer look at the
elliptic group Ep(a,b). In our above example, we pick the
prime number p = 23 (it is noted that this is only for explaining
the new protocol, in real life the p is bigger than this), we have
quadratic residues group (p - 1)/2 = 11 and for this group the
Ep(a,b) can be shown as below:
j(0,1) (0,22) (1,7) (1,16) (3,10) (3,13) (4,0) )(5,4) (5,19) (6,4) (6,19) (7,11) (7,12) (9,7)£2ll,l)= (9,16) (11,3) (11,20) (12,4) (12,19) (13,7) (13,16)
(17,3) (17,20) (18,3) (18,20) (19,5) (19,18)
(11)
As we described in above that any point sitting in equation
(11) can be appointed as generator point "G ," in the traditional
way (as in section II) the G is fixed and let it be in public . But
now we are not going to do so. As the generator is hidden,
there is no way to know which point is generator therefore the
attacker can not make the "man-in-middle" attack . Now we
are going to show two ways to complete the ECC processing,
first way is that making protocol that has the common principle
to work out the generator point, say from the distribution of
elliptic Ep(a,b) group; or by the new protocol to work out the
PM as shown below.
In order to make a common principle to work out the
generator point for Alice and Bob, say we are going to use the
distribution of elliptic Ep(a,b) group, we need to check the
what it looks like. The equation (11) can be shown in Figure 4.
Figure4. Distribution of EllipticGroup£23(1 ,1).
We now pick a generator point G by a character of the above
distribution, say we pick the G when G (a, b) E Ep(a,b) with a
= max {a} and b = max {b} (it is noted that other principle will
apply). In this example, G = (19, 18). Note that we put a =
max {a} first, so choosing it a = 19 then choose b = max {b} .
The order is important, in this case it is not the G = (18, 20).
When the generator point fixed we can have the following
processing as described in section II. In fact this way is more
secure as the man (or women) has to do is decrypt the message
from Bob re-encrypt it with Alice's key and he can monitor the
communication without detection. This situation can be shown
in Figure 5.
Alice Attacker
Takingn. <n Takingnc<n
Making n,G
. -- --+- MakingneG . ----
Retrieving neG Retrievingn,G and n,G
Computing n,ncG Computing n,neG andn,ncG
Figure5. A new protocol protectingthe man-in-the-middle attck. As the G is
not at the public, the attackcannotworkout nCG as tranditional way does, so
even the attackercan momite the communication but no way to understand
and attackthe communications. The yellowone doesnot work for the new
protocol and the real line workswith a protecting.
This issue involves the user of a trusted "certificate
authority" (CA) . When is queried the CA and returns a
digitally signed "certificate" that can be compared to one that
has been transmitted by another means. In an authenticated
key exchange based on the difficulty of the kth root problem
was described in section II.
Now let's turn to our 2nd way, i.e., a new protocol to get the
hidden generator point done .
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When Alice is going to send the message to Bob, Alice sends
the pair of points Pc (as shown (1) in the figure) as below:
Pc = [(n~IG),(n~1PM + n~IG)]
In the 2nd way, we need to face the case that Alice has no
information about Bob's public key as traditional way does.
Therefore if Alice would like to send a message to Bob, Alice
cannot use public key to make cryptography to the message
Alice wanted to send. We may use, as an example, a protocol
shown in Figure 6.
(12)
It is clear that the first way discussed above is less
computing calculation in comparison with the second way but
it is need the "common principle" or "common protocol"
before the communication. If this common protocol is to be
sent by communication network it will have a risk to be
attacked or it will have to create a "safe way" to inform first
then go ahead for the rest. For the second way, it is obviously
it takes more time than that in traditional way, which is the
price to pay for protecting communications from the man-in-
middle attacks.
IV. SPEEDING UP ALGORITHMS OVER ECC
Experiences showed that for the popular and powerful
ECC, the most expensive operation in elliptic curve based
cryptographic protocol is the scalar multiplication. There are
many papers investigated this issue, such as ECC using
modified complementary [17], binary method [18], non-
adjacent form (NAF) [19], and mutual opposite form (MOF)
[18] and complements method [20], etc.
The scalar multiplication is very expensive operation in
elliptic curve based cryptographic protocol. Hence, the speed
of scalar multiplication plays an important role in the efficient
system.
Scalar multiplication is the computation of the form Q =
kP, where P and Q are the elliptic curve points (as figures
shown) and k is an integer. It can be obtained by repeated
elliptic curve point addition and doubling operations. In the
binary algorithms, the integer k is represented as
I-I
k = Ik j 2j where kj E {0,1},
j=O
Time
·1
nPmB
Figure 6. A protocol for the ECC with hidden generator point.
TIme
Here, n-IA meets the equation: unity = n-IA ns; we still called n-
IA as private key for Alice but there is no need to worry about
the public key as G is hidden at current situation. So either PA
or Pa is not really useful in this case. When Bob received Pc,
he can operate as below:
n~1PM = n~1PM + n~IG - n~IG
Then, Bob can make PD as below and sends it to Alice as
shown the (2) in Figure 5.
P -I -I DD=nAnBrM
When Alice received PD, Alice can make PE and sent it to Bob
as shown (3) in the Figure 5.
PE = (nA)PD = (nA)(n~ln~IPM) = n~IPM
Then when Bob received PE, Bob can obtain the message
related PMthat sent from Alice by
PM =nBn~IPM
This can obtained only by Bob as no one has the private key
that Bob has.
which scans the bits of k either from left-to-right or right-to-
left. The cost of multiplication depends on the length of the
binary representation of k and the number of Hanning weight
of scalar representation in this representation. If the
representation (kn-I .. ./co)2 with kn_I:;tO then the number of
doubling operation is (n-l). In an average, binary algorithm
requires (n-1) doublings and (n-1)12 additions. For example,
k= 1778, then k= (11011111100)2 so computation of 1778 P
requires 10 doublings and 5 additions .
It is well known that a algorithm called non-adjacent form
(NAF), based on the fact that k is represented as
I-I
k = Ik j 2j , with kj E {-I ,O,I}, which using three digits
j =O
{O, 1, -I} -radix 2 representation and this conversion is taken
from right-to-left. The average Hamming weight of signed
binary representation is n/3 and it has the lower Hamming
weight than the binary algorithm. However, it is noted the
Hamming weight is one of keys to handle computation load,
for example, k = 255, or (11111111)2, computation of 255P
requires 7 point additions, but if it is transformed by
(10000000-1)P, which is 256P-P, only one addition is
required .
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k=1788=(2a -1)-C1
= (211 -I) - 00100000011
This means k = 1788 = (100000000000 - 00100000011-1 )2'
which gives :
1788 = 2048 - 256 - 2 - 1 - 1
where C1 = 1's complement of the number
a = number ofdigits to be handled by the computer
k = binary number whose 1's complement
As an example, let k =1788, or k = (11011111100)2 in its
binary form. ~ = 1's Complement of the number of k and the
a in this example it is in binary form is 11. Therefore from
the equation (12) we have:
C1 = (2a -I)-k = (211-1)-(11011111100)
= 00100000011
Therefore we
Hence, this shows that the Hamming Weight of scalar k has
reduced from original 8 to current 5 which will save 3 elliptic
curve addition operations. One addition operation requires 2
Squaring, 2 Multiplication and 1 inverse operation. But if the
original binary form of k is critical for this method as if the
number of 1s in original binary form of k is > the one-half of
the bit's length, i.e, 1's number 2: al2 then there is no need to
convert the original binary format into "1 's complement
format" as our target is to decrease Harming weight. So our
proposed algorithm is that (1) check the l's number of the
binary form, if it is 2: a12, then go to the "complementary
algorithm", if it is not, then go to "1 's complement format",
i.e, go to the equation (13) then go to equation (14).
There is another algorithm needs to be mentioned, the
mutual opposite form (MOF), which converts the binary string
to MOF from the most significant bit efficiently. The n-bit
binary string k is converted into a signed binary string by mk =
2k - k, with "-" stands for a bit subtraction. The conversion of
MOF representation of an integer is highly flexible because
conversion can be made either from right-to-Ieft or left-to-right.
The output ofMOF is comparable efficiency with out ofNAF
as shown in.
As above described it is clearly to see that every mentioned
algorithm makes the target that decreasing the Hamming
weight to increase the efficient computation over ECC. As
shown that the MOF and complementary algorithms are almost
the same level in terms of computation costs we may take
complementary algorithm as part of hybrid algorithm as shown
below. But we need to present the so-called "the 1's
complement ofbinary numbers" described by Gillie [21].
The 1's complement of any binary number may be found
by the following equation [21]:
v. CONCLUSION
We have introduced the secure effective and efficient
sensor networks in this paper.
As security issue has been paid more attentions. In recent
years some cryptographic algorithms have obtained popularity
due to properties that make them suitable for use in constrained
environment such as mobile information appliances, sensor
networks, where computing resources and power availability
are limited. Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is one of them.
However, in the applications of ECC, in particular for the
sensor networks there are always so-called man-in-middle
attacks, in particular those networks are with very limited
computing capacity and restricted power resources, which drew
the researchers' attractions. In this paper we have presented
two methods for protecting from man-in-middle attacks based
on hidden generator point with ECC.
The importance of security in communication system has
become increasingly prominent, and its major technology
cryptography technology develops rapidly. ECC has become
an important branch of public key cryptography system as it
has many benefits for the devices for wireless network, which
has restrictions of the limited bandwidth, processing power,
and storage space and power consumption.
The efficiency of ECC implementation is highly dependent
on the performance of arithmetic operations of scalar
multiplication. This paper based on discussions of the current
major algorithms present a novel algorithm, hybrid of the "1 's
complement of binary number" and "complementary" to
minimizing Harming weight to speed up the calculation over
ECC. The fmal results are summarized in the table shown in
below, where the results obtained from [15] was used.
In terms of average, the proposed algorithm is about 12.5%
saved time in comparison with the results of complementary
algorithm in [17].
As we have seen that due to the checking processing, there
is always the case that the Hamming Weight will less than the
half of the length (in terms of digit number) and the either
complement of the number method or 1's complement of the
number method will constantly keep the Hamming Weight
minimizing, which makes this method sitting on the very
power saving position due to the computing works.
It is noted that here there is a checking processing before go
head for which way to calculate the scale multiplication, which
there is time costs but as the either way for the computation of
the scale multiplication is the most efficient due to the
minimizing Harming weight the saved time can pay the
checking costs. In fact the fmal results, which is shown in the
next section by the table, support this conclusion due to the
checking processing is almost costing nothing in comparison
with the saved time when the Harming weight is minimized.
(13)
(14)
C1 =(2a -I)-k
k =(2 a -I) - C1Or
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Figure 7. Comparison the proposed algorithm with the nominated
algorithms by [17] (the data for the nominated algorithms were used from the
same reference).
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